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COMMENT
PUTTING ACCESSIBLE EXPRESSION TO BED
Jamila A. Odeh*
In 2011, the Occupy movement began. Occupiers seized space in dozens of
public parks and in the American imagination, providing a compelling illustration of an inclusive format of political expression. In the courtroom, protesters sought injunctive relief on First Amendment grounds to protect the
tent encampments where Occupiers slept. In 2017, the last of the Occupy litigation ended; but the ramifications the Occupy cases hold for the First
Amendment and expressive conduct remain unexamined.
This Comment takes an in-depth look at the adjudication of Occupiers’ First
Amendment interest in sleeping in public parks. It analyzes the adjudication
of the Occupy cases and contends that the pattern of judicial enforcement results from a desire to remove the appearance of disorder associated with
houselessness. This Comment argues that the test used to set the scrutiny level
for First Amendment expressive activity systematically disadvantages speech
by and about houseless persons.
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INTRODUCTION
It is illegal to be houseless and unsheltered in most American cities. 2 In
late 2010, two parents and their three children in Wenatchee, Washington,
believed that their period of houselessness was nearly over. 3 After a year
without housing, they were finally closing a lease. Late at night—long after
public restrooms closed—the father was arrested for public urination. 4 Because of that arrest, the family missed its appointment with an apartment
manager the next morning, and the opportunity vanished. 5
The law against public urination that stymied the family’s hopes for
housing is part of a larger body of laws called “broken windows” policies. 6
These policies began three decades earlier in New York City, and a cascade
of similar ordinances quickly swept across America. 7 In 2011, the family of
1

1. This Comment uses the term “houseless” and not “homeless,” because it more accurately describes a broader population of people experiencing housing insecurity, and it does
not imply the experience is an immutable characteristic.
2. Don Mitchell, Anti-Homeless Laws and Public Space: I. Begging and the First
Amendment, 19 URB. GEOGRAPHY 6 (1998); Don Mitchell, Anti-Homeless Laws and Public
Space: II. Further Constitutional Issues, 19 URB. GEOGRAPHY 98 (1998); NAT’L LAW CTR. ON
HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS: ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 10, 52–71 (2016), https://www.nlchp.org/documents/HousingNot-Handcuffs (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
3. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, CRIMINALIZING CRISIS: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 33–34 (2011) [hereinafter CRIMINALIZING
CRISIS], https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Criminalizing_Crisis [https://perma.cc/3U73KEYH].
4. Id. at 34.
5. Id.
6. Broken windows policies prioritize the strict application of petty crime laws in an
effort to prevent serious criminal activity. They often include the expansion of criminal law for
petty crimes like vandalism, loitering, and panhandling and take a zero-tolerance approach to
enforcement. See Eric Klinenberg, The Other Side of “Broken Windows,” NEW YORKER (Aug.
23, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/the-other-side-of-broken-windows
[https://perma.cc/T2XD-AVYD].
7. Ngozi C. Kamalu & Emmanuel C. Onyeozili, A Critical Analysis of the ‘Broken Windows’ Policing in New York City and Its Impact: Implications for the Criminal Justice System
and the African American Community, 11 AFR. J. CRIMINOLOGY & JUST. STUD. 71, 72 (2018);
Klinenberg, supra note 6; see infra Section I.A. The “broken windows” label came from an influential article by George Kelling and James Wilson that “used the analogy that a broken window, left unattended, would signal that no one cared and ultimately lead to more disorder and
even crime.” Sarah Childress, The Problem with “Broken Windows” Policing, FRONTLINE (June
28, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-problem-with-broken-windowspolicing/ [https://perma.cc/Q53B-9WE9].
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five from Wenatchee remained houseless. 8 The criminalization of living unsheltered made housing unattainable. That same year, Occupy Wall Street
began 9 and quickly spread across America. 10
Occupy’s key feature, twenty-four-hour protests in tent encampments,
had its roots in tent communities set up by houseless people. 11 But as police
worked to disperse the protesters, Occupiers learned what houseless people
knew all along, that “biologically necessary activities are illegal when performed in American streets—not just peeing, but sitting, lying down and
sleeping.” 12 One houseless-outreach worker explained: “The city will not tolerate a tent city. . . . The camps have to be out of sight.” 13 Yet visibility for the
encampments was the protesters’ explicit goal. 14
Occupy put a national spotlight on the criminalization of public sleeping
when several Occupy groups challenged anti-sleeping ordinances on First
Amendment grounds. 15 Because sleeping in the encampments was an activity potent with political meaning, it was ostensibly protected by the First
Amendment. But the anti-sleeping laws made this core aspect of Occupy’s
expression illegal. 16 Occupiers sought injunctions to cease enforcement of
anti-sleeping ordinances. The courts, however, applied tests for contentneutral regulations and held that the sleeping restrictions were valid. 17

8. CRIMINALIZING CRISIS, supra note 3, at 34.
9. Oleg Komlik, The Original Email that Started Occupy Wall Street, ECON. SOC. &
POL. ECON. (Dec. 27, 2014), https://economicsociology.org/2014/12/27/the-original-emailthat-started-occupy-wall-street/ [https://perma.cc/7NGR-GYWB]; see Martin Kaste, Exploring
Occupy Wall Street’s ‘Adbuster’ Origins, NPR (Oct. 20, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/
2011/10/20/141526467/exploring-occupy-wall-streets-adbuster-origins
[https://perma.cc/
A9F9-E5SF].
10. ‘Occupy Wall Street’ Protests Spread Across the Country, ABC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2011),
https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/10/occupy-wall-street-protests-spread-acrossthe-country-bloomberg-calls-them-misguided [http://perma.cc/7LKY-T343]; Michael Levitin,
The Triumph of Occupy Wall Street, ATLANTIC (Jun. 10, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2015/06/the-triumph-of-occupy-wall-street/395408/ [https://perma.cc/H7KEZBGT].
11. Barbara Ehrenreich, Occupy Wall Street Brings Homelessness into the Open,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2011, 12:45 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
cifamerica/2011/oct/24/occupy-wall-street-homelessness-us
[https://perma.cc/G9S8-8Q37]
(“[T]ent cities are the domestic progenitors of the American occupation movement.”).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Jen Schradie, Why Tents (Still) Matter for the Occupy Movement, COMMON
DREAMS (Nov. 24, 2011), https://www.commondreams.org/views/2011/11/24/why-tents-stillmatter-occupy-movement [https://perma.cc/C5UB-A7XK] (discussing the symbolic and political significance of visible tents to Occupy’s cause).
15. See, e.g., Eyder Peralta, The Occupy Movement and the First Amendment: ‘A Classic
Collision,’ NPR (Nov. 15, 2011, 1:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2011/
11/15/142348726/the-occupy-movement-and-the-first-amendment-a-classic-collision [https://
perma.cc/GR6S-TDKY].
16. See infra notes 227–235 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Section I.B.
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This Comment argues that the use of content-neutral and content-based
analysis for expressive conduct facilitates the systematic exclusion of expression by and about houseless people. Part I explains the development of antisleeping ordinances and jurisprudence on expressive conduct. Part II assesses the Occupy First Amendment challenges. Part III contends that when
courts afford less scrutiny for content-neutral restrictions on expressive conduct, they also condone removing the appearance of houselessness from
public spaces. Ultimately, the Occupy cases illustrate a more pervasive issue:
courts have undermined the accessibility of expressive conduct in the public
forum for all Americans.
I.

THE ANTI-SLEEPING ORDINANCE AND EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT

Criminal laws prohibiting sleeping in public and First Amendment jurisprudence on expressive activity converge in the public parks of American
cities. Section I.A highlights criminal anti-sleeping laws. Section I.B explores
First Amendment jurisprudence on sleeping as an expressive activity.
A. The Criminal Prohibition on Sleeping
Policing public space in a city to force houseless people elsewhere is a
common way to make unsheltered people another city’s problem. 18 Many
ordinances criminalize sleeping in public, 19 even though most houseless
people cannot find shelter indoors. 20 Therefore, compliance with antisleeping laws is effectively impossible for most houseless people. 21
Discriminatory enforcement is well documented. 22 Police cannot find
and remove everyone who sleeps in public, so seeking out people who look
houseless is an easier, 23 more enforceable approach. 24 Moreover, policing
18. Marc L. Roark, Homelessness at the Cathedral, 80 MO. L. REV. 53, 76 nn.121–22, 110
(2015).
19. Id. at 81 (“Cities regularly enact ordinances aimed at preventing homeless persons
from sleeping in public spaces.”); Bryce Covert, When Trying to Survive While Homeless Is
Made Illegal, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 17, 2016, 1:01 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/
criminalization-homelessness-908918d0a46/ [https://perma.cc/UET7-D2TT] (“Today, a third
of the country’s cities ban camping in public, nearly one in five ban sleeping in public . . . .”);
see NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS & NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, A
DREAM DENIED: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 16–17, 24–78 (2006),
https://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MMD5-9WZ8] (providing narratives of cities with measures that criminalize
homelessness, many including sleeping bans).
20. Sara K. Rankin, The Influence of Exile, 76 MD. L. REV. 4, 43 (2016) (“[T]he majority
of homeless people are forced to live in public.”).
21. See Randall Amster, Patterns of Exclusion: Sanitizing Space, Criminalizing Homelessness, 30 SOC. JUST., no. 1, 2003, at 195.
22. See id. at 208; see also Alafair Burke, Policing, Protestors, and Discretion, 40
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 999, 1002–05 (2013).
23. See Jessica Gerrard & David Farrugia, The ‘Lamentable Sight’ of Homelessness and
the Society of the Spectacle, 52 URB. STUD. 2219, 2223–24 (2015); David M. Smith, Note, A The-
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appearance is an overt goal in many cities. 25 Broken windows policies promote “the idea that eliminating visible signs of disorder deters more serious
crime.” 26 They stigmatize houseless people as a visible sign of danger. 27 But
the threat is only “one of perception.”28 An increased houseless population
does not necessarily correspond to a rise in crime. 29 More importantly, the
policies dehumanize people by viewing them as problems. 30
B. Expressive Conduct Jurisprudence
The First Amendment protects forms of expression beyond written and
spoken words. 31 Conduct, including sleeping, can be communicative. 32
Sleeping is a particularly difficult form of expression to adjudicate, because it
is “a nonexpressive everyday function, yet it may also be performed for
communicative reasons.” 33
The threshold question is whether conduct is sufficiently expressive for
First Amendment protection. 34 The Supreme Court created a two-prong test
for the inquiry. First, was the conduct “intended to be communicative”?35
Second, would the conduct “in context . . . be understood by the viewer to be

oretical and Legal Challenge to Homeless Criminalization as Public Policy, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 487, 496–97 (1994).
24. See Amster, supra note 21, at 197, 208–09 & 216 n.10.
25. Id. at 201 (“[S]ome cities state expressly that their intention is to . . . . remove homeless people from particular places, such as parks, streets or downtown areas. . . . Some target the
‘visible’ homeless with the goal of making them ‘invisible.’ ” (quoting Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and Its Criminalization, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV., no. 1, 1996, at 1,
22–23)).
26. Roark, supra note 18, at 73–74 (“[P]roponents of the broken window hypothesis
often point to homelessness as a precursor to greater criminal tendencies for an area.”).
27. See id. at 81. See generally Gerrard & Farrugia, supra note 23, at 2221 (analyzing how
onlookers visually interpret images of homeless people).
28. Amster, supra note 21, at 196 (emphasis omitted).
29. See id. at 209; Roark, supra note 18, at 80–82; Smith, supra note 23, at 496.
30. See Amster, supra note 21, at 207–09; Roark, supra note 18, at 80–82.
31. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995).
32. See Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1327–28 (M.D.
Fla. 2011) (recognizing sleeping in public as protected under the First Amendment in the context of Occupy Fort Myers); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931).
33. Laurie Magid, Note, First Amendment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 467, 467 (1984).
34. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974); see also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984).
35. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294.
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communicative”? 36 If a plaintiff cannot meet the two-prong test, there is no
claim. 37 If the plaintiff meets both prongs, the Constitution limits the government’s ability to restrict the expression. The Court uses a balancing test
to assess whether the governmental restriction is valid. 38
There are a few iterations of the balancing test that may apply depending
on the nature of the government’s restriction. 39 The first time the Court articulated a balancing test in the context of expressive conduct was in 1968, in
United States v. O’Brien. 40 The case involved a Vietnam War dissenter who
was convicted for intentionally burning his draft card before a large crowd. 41
But the relevant statute targeted his conduct, not his message. 42 Further, the
government interest—the administrative ease of raising armed forces—was
“unrelated to the suppression of free expression.” 43 The Court propounded a
test that applies when a restriction on speech is incidental, rather than intended to suppress speech. 44 The restriction is permissible “if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest . . . and if the incidental restriction . . . is no greater than is essential 45 to the furtherance of that interest.” 46 In effect, the Court created a balancing test in which an important
governmental interest may outweigh incidental restrictions on speech. 47
Over a decade after O’Brien, the Court articulated a second balancing
test. The time, place, or manner (TPM) test also covers expressive conduct in
some instances when the regulation is content neutral. 48 This test applies
when a content-neutral regulation limits the time, the place, or the man-

36. Id. An early iteration of the test also required a particularized message, but the Court
abandoned that criterion, allowing greater flexibility. Compare Spence, 418 U.S. at 409–11, with
Clark, 468 U.S. at 294.
37. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 294.
38. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Clark, 468 U.S. 288; United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
39. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412; Clark, 468 U.S. at 294; O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77.
40. See 391 U.S. at 376–77; Claire Howard, A New First Amendment Battleground: Challenges Facing Local Governments by the Occupy Movement and Proactive Responses to Future
Movements, 45 URB. LAW. 473, 480 (2013).
41. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 369.
42. Id. at 375.
43. Id. at 377.
44. Id. at 376.
45. “[N]o greater than is essential” was later interpreted as a balancing test only. United
States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688–89 (1985) (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
46. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
47. Christine Verbitsky, The Occupy Wall Street Movement and the Constitution: Protesters Preoccupied with the First Amendment, 29 TOURO L. REV. 1003, 1008–10 (2013).
48. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294–95 (1984); Members of
the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984). Content neutral means
that the regulation did not target the content of speech. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct.
2218, 2227 (2015) (reinterpreting content neutral from the more traditional route followed in
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 817).
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ner—when, where, or how—the message is communicated. 49 TPM restrictions are only valid if “they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and . . . they leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information.” 50 If a TPM restriction is content
based, however, the test will require strict scrutiny in order for the restriction
to remain valid. 51
The relationship between the O’Brien and TPM tests is important. The
two tests sometimes overlap. And in many circumstances, both apply. 52 This
is because TPM regulations often impose only incidental restrictions on
speech. The two tests are also substantially similar in their treatment of content-neutral regulations. O’Brien uses “important or substantial” governmental interest, and the TPM test uses “significant” governmental interest.53
The Court has explained that there is “little, if any,” difference between these
standards. 54
The Court applies more scrutiny to content-based restrictions. For example, in Texas v. Johnson, the Court adjudicated a content-based restriction
that targeted a particular message. 55 There, the respondent burned a U.S. flag
and chanted, “America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you,” at the 1984
Republican National Convention. 56 The content-based regulation prohibited
disrespectful flag burning, but it permitted respectful burning as a method to
dispose of a flag. 57 The Court characterized this distinction as a contentbased restriction on speech. 58 It required that “[a] law directed at the communicative nature of conduct must, like a law directed at speech itself, be
justified by the substantial showing of need that the First Amendment re-

49. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)); Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (collecting cases).
50. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (describing the requirements of the TPM test). The Court has
articulated the final prong of the test in different ways. Compare U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981) (setting the standard as “leaves open adequate alternative channels for communication”), with City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (setting the standard as “do[es] not unreasonably limit alternative
avenues of communication”).
51. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.
52. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797–99 (1989); Clark, 468 U.S.
at 298 & n.8.
53. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
54. Clark, 468 U.S. at 298 (declining to apply O’Brien due to the substantial similarity to
TPM).
55. 491 U.S. 397, 410–11 (1989).
56. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399.
57. See id. at 416–17.
58. Id.
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quires.” 59 Similarly, as previously mentioned, where TPM applies, a contentbased restriction will receive strict scrutiny. 60
In sum, whether a restriction targets content is an important consideration for all forms of expressive speech. Once a court determines that conduct
is expressive, it must determine whether it is content neutral. This finding
determines the applicable level of scrutiny for the regulation. If the restriction is content neutral, it will receive the more deferential O’Brien and
TPM standards. If the restriction is content based and the TPM test applies,
that test dictates application of strict scrutiny. 61 Under Johnson, a contentbased restriction will also receive an increased form of scrutiny. 62
The Supreme Court has contemplated sleeping as an expressive activity
only once, in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence. 63 The case involved a Department of the Interior ordinance that prohibited camping on
National Park Service lands not specifically designated for camping. 64 Protesters were interested in sleeping in a tent encampment on the National
Mall to demonstrate the difficulties of houselessness. 65 The issue was whether the restriction, as applied to the protesters, violated the First Amendment. 66 Ultimately, the Court declined to determine whether sleeping was
expressive conduct. 67 It concluded that even if the activity was protected, the
government regulation was a valid TPM restriction and met the O’Brien
test. 68 The restriction was content neutral because it applied to protesters
and nonprotesters alike. 69 The regulation “narrowly focuse[d] on the Government’s substantial interest in maintaining the parks.” 70 Additionally,
there were ample alternative channels for communication, because the National Park Service permitted the protest group to leave its tent encampment
in place, maintaining the group’s visual message. 71 Accordingly, the Court
held that there was no First Amendment violation. 72 Importantly, the
maintenance of the aesthetic value of public parks as a significant governmental interest was essential to that holding. 73

59. Id. at 406 (emphasis altered) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703
F.2d 586, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Clark, 468 U.S. 288).
60. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
61. See id.
62. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
63. 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
64. Clark, 468 U.S. at 289–90.
65. Id. at 291–92.
66. Id. at 289.
67. Id. at 293.
68. Id. at 295, 298.
69. Id. at 295.
70. Id. at 296.
71. Id. at 295.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 296.
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Clark serves as the primary guide for restrictions on public sleeping. Its
framework was later applied to an injunction merits analysis in Metropolitan
Council, Inc. v. Safir, an important lower court case that occurred preOccupy. 74 The protesters in Metropolitan Council planned to sleep on New
York City sidewalks, taking up half the walking area, as a vigil for housing
issues. 75 Aware that the New York City Police Department strictly prohibited
sleeping on public walkways, the protesters filed for an injunction on First
Amendment grounds. 76 The Court applied the TPM test to its merits analysis and awarded injunctive relief. 77
The First Amendment cases that resulted from the Occupy movement
created a burst of new decisions on the issue of sleeping as an expressive activity. These cases were not resolved until as late as 2017, 78 and their impact
on First Amendment jurisprudence and social movements remains unassessed. This Comment reviews the pattern of First Amendment enforcement, a task only possible in retrospect. Although Occupiers removed their
encampments from public parks eight years ago, the continued relevance is
twofold. First, social and political movements—including the Standing Rock
protests and the Black Lives Matter movement—continue to use similar tactics. 79 Second, the Occupy context provides broadly applicable insights into
conduct-based First Amendment claims and the accessibility of speech,
which affects all Americans.
II.

CONTENT-DRIVEN JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT

The Occupy cases relevant to this inquiry began when Occupy protesters, facing anti-sleeping laws, asked courts to enjoin law enforcement from
removing the Occupiers. 80 Courts declined to protect the protesters’ interest

74. 99 F. Supp. 2d 438, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
75. Metropolitan Council, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 440.
76. Id. at 439.
77. Id. at 443–48.
78. See, e.g., Krinks v. Haslam, No. 3:12-cv-01095, 2017 WL 1857352 (M.D. Tenn. May
9, 2017), report and recommendation accepted sub nom. Custer v. Haslam, No. 3:12-cv-01095,
2017 WL 2591831 (M.D. Tenn. June 15, 2017).
79. For example, Standing Rock and Black Lives Matter used encampments as a tactic.
At Standing Rock, this reclaiming of space challenged colonialism. Similarly, some activists for
the Black Lives Matter movement set out to “Decolonize LA City Hall”—physically occupying
the space in an effort to pressure Mayor Eric Garcetti to meet with them publicly. Elsewhere,
Black Lives Matter advocates built encampments as safe, police-free environments. Much like
Occupy, the uniting principle was creating and living in their respective desired communities.
See Sarah Jaffe, Occupy Is Everywhere, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 6, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/
article/137512/occupy-everywhere [https://perma.cc/6AXS-GCYC]; Zach Stafford, Chicago
Protesters Occupy Homan Square for Eighth Day to Demand Closure, GUARDIAN (Jul. 29, 2016,
12:05 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/29/chicago-protestors-occupyhoman-square-police-black-lives-matter [https://perma.cc/36JV-7A2Y].
80. See, e.g., Occupy Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113,
1119 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
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in sleeping as an expressive activity, but they did so for different reasons and
at various stages in the proceedings. 81
From the outset of the Occupy cases, courts across the country recognized that sleeping was an expressive activity protected by the First Amendment. 82 After agreeing on this threshold question, the cases diverged
considerably. They fall into three categories: (1) cases in which early success
on sleeping claims at the temporary restraining order (TRO) stage flipped at
the preliminary injunction stage, (2) cases that vindicated traditional First
Amendment rights—but not sleeping claims—with preliminary injunctions, 83 and (3) cases that were not granted any form of relief. These categories are arranged in temporal order according to the length of time protests
had been on the ground at the time the cases were heard. For example, although the cases in category three ended at the earliest procedural stage, the
cases generally commenced after the protests had been on the ground the
longest. 84 This temporal accounting is significant because the amount of
time the encampments were standing is inversely related to the success of the
First Amendment challenges. Importantly, the factual inquiries that the
courts purportedly based their decisions upon—like the injunctive relief
standard and indicia suggesting content-based regulations—do not predict
or adequately explain the disparity in the outcomes of the cases.
A. Cases that Flipped 85
There were several cases in which the Occupiers won on the sleeping issue at the TRO stage, but in all of these cases the courts did not grant relief at

81. Compare Watters v. Otter, 26 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1019 (D. Idaho 2014) (granting a
permanent injunction protecting tents), and Occupy Bos. v. City of Boston, No.
SUCV201104152G, 2011 WL 7460294, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 2011) (granting a TRO
protecting sleeping in the tents), with Occupy Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (dismissing
activists’ request for a permanent injunction for failure to state a claim), and Occupy Bos. v.
City of Boston, No. 11-4152-G, at 24 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2011),
https://cbsboston.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/untitled.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6MYE-P3M4
(order denying preliminary injunction).
82. See Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, 949 F. Supp. 2d 777, 798–99 (M.D. Tenn. 2013),
rev’d, 769 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2014); Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 866 F. Supp. 2d 545, 557
(D.S.C. 2011); Occupy Fresno v. County of Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d 849, 857 (E.D. Cal. 2011);
Freeman v. Morris, No. 11-cv-00452-NT, 2011 WL 6139216, at *5 (D. Me. Dec. 9, 2011),
amended Dec. 12, 2011; Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1062,
1069 (D. Minn. 2011); Occupy Bos., 2011 WL 7460294, at *2; Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort
Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2011). In 2011, the Middle District of Florida was
the first to make this determination. Occupy Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 1328.
83. Although overlap between the first two categories is ostensibly possible, no case fell
into both.
84. See infra Section II.C.
85. “Cases that Flipped” refers to when injunctive relief was granted at the TRO stage
but was not granted at the preliminary injunction stage. The title rests on the idea that the
change in a merits assessment, implicit in the decisions due to the standard for injunctive relief
and special features of First Amendment claims for such relief, constitutes a flip.
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the preliminary injunction stage, and the Occupiers lost their previously
granted injunctions. The tendency to flip from granting the relief to not
granting the relief indicates that courts were more inclined to grant TROs
than preliminary injunctions. For example, in cases in five different cities,
the courts initially granted TROs and later rescinded the injunctions at the
preliminary injunction hearings. 86 The cases suggest a pattern: on a nearly
identical issue, it is easier to win on a TRO than it is to win on a preliminary
injunction. Significantly, in the context of the cases that vindicated traditional First Amendment rights and the cases without relief granted, the pattern
holds true. Including all the cases, there are five in which TROs were granted 87 and five in which TROs were denied. 88 By contrast, there is one case in
which a preliminary injunction was granted, 89 and there are nine in which
preliminary injunctions were denied. 90
The legal standards for TROs and preliminary injunctions are identical
for First Amendment purposes. The standards consider (1) the likelihood of
success on the merits, (2) whether irreparable harm will result without the
injunctive relief, (3) whether the balance of equities tips in the favor of injunctive relief, and (4) whether an injunction is in the public interest. 91 The
distinctions between TROs and preliminary injunctions are procedural. Unlike a preliminary injunction, a TRO—which has a shorter duration than a

86. In Occupy Boston v. City of Boston, a TRO was granted but relief was revoked a
month later at the preliminary injunction hearing. No. 11-4152-G, at 2–3. In Isbell v. City of
Oklahoma City and Mitchell v. City of New Haven, relief granted on TROs in 2011 ended when
the Occupiers were denied preliminary injunctions. See Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F.
Supp. 2d 238, 241, 254 (D. Conn. 2012); Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV-11-1423-D,
2011 WL 6152852, at *1, *10 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2011). Similarly, in Occupy Columbia v. Haley and Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, the courts granted TROs and preliminary injunctions but
later reversed previously granted preliminary injunctions. See Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, 769
F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2014); Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 2013); Occupy
Columbia v. Haley, No. 3:11-cv-03253-CMC, 2011 WL 6698990, at *7 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2011).
87. See supra sources cited note 86 (listing five cases granting a TRO).
88. See Occupy Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1114 (E.D. Cal.
2012); Occupy Tucson v. City of Tucson, No. CV-11-699-TUC-CKJ, 2011 WL 6747860 (D.
Ariz. Dec. 22, 2011); Occupy Fresno v. County of Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d 849, 853 (E.D. Cal.
2011); Davidovich v. City of San Diego, No. 11cv2675 WQH-NLS, 2011 WL 6013010, at *7
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 1 2011); Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1062,
1069, 1071–72 (D. Minn. 2011).
89. Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 866 F. Supp. 2d 545, 563 (D.S.C. 2011). Occupy Nashville is the only other case to enter a Preliminary Injunction on a sleeping issue, but it was by
agreement of the parties. Occupy Nashville, 769 F.3d at 440.
90. See Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 254; Watters v. Otter, 854 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825–26
(D. Idaho 2012); Occupy Columbia, 2011 WL 6698990, at *6; Occupy Tucson, 2011 WL 6747860
at *8; Occupy Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 865–66; Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *10; Freeman v.
Morris, No. 11-cv-00452-NT, 2011 WL 6139216, at *12 (D. Me. Dec. 9, 2011), amended Dec.
12, 2011; Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1338–39 (M.D. Fla.
2011); Occupy Bos., No. 11-4152-G, at 24.
91. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Free Country Ltd. v. Drennen, 235 F. Supp. 3d. 559, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
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preliminary injunction—is often heard ex parte and is often granted in advance of significant discovery. 92 Ostensibly, a preliminary injunction is more
difficult to win primarily because of the increased attention to the claims that
comes with the longer amount of time it would be in place, but this distinction is diminished in the First Amendment context.
The test for the two types of injunction is more likely to reach the same
conclusion when there is a valid First Amendment claim. When a First
Amendment right is at stake, “irreparable harm is ‘inseparably linked’ to the
likelihood of success on the merits.” 93 This is because the denial of a constitutional right is automatically considered an irreparable harm. 94 The public
interest factor also turns on the likelihood of success on the merits, “because
it is always in the public interest to protect constitutional rights.” 95 Thus, in
these cases, a determination on the likelihood of success on the merits
should drive the choice to grant a TRO and a preliminary injunction alike.
Given that courts apply the same standard, the difference in outcomes
between TROs and preliminary injunctions is difficult to reconcile. In reversing earlier TROs at the preliminary injunction stage, 96 courts did not report shifts in the merits of the First Amendment claim. 97 For example, in
Mitchell v. City of New Haven (Occupy New Haven), the court denied the
Occupiers’ motion for preliminary injunction on the merits. 98 The court
acknowledged that the protesters were engaged in protected speech but
found that the city’s rules were “constitutionally acceptable, content-neutral
restrictions.” 99 The court did not indicate changes to the factual situation or

92. Free Country Ltd., 235 F. Supp. 3d. at 565; see FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)–(b).
93. Occupy Columbia, 866 F. Supp. at 553 (quoting WV Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2009)); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”); Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at
245 (quoting Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373); Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852 at *9 (quoting Elrod, 427 U.S. at
373); Occupy Bos. v. City of Boston, No. SUCV201104152G, 2011 WL 7460294, at *3 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 2011) (quoting Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373).
94. Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 545 F.3d 685, 690 (8th Cir. 2008).
95. Id.; Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1067 (D.
Minn. 2011); see M Devon Moore, Note, The Preliminary Injunction Standard: Understanding
the Public Interest Factor, 117 MICH. L. REV. 939, 957 (“Unconstitutional government actions
are an affront to the public interest and provide an imperative in favor of granting a preliminary injunction. This . . . is driven by the interrelatedness of the merits and public interest factors.” (footnote omitted)).
96. See Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 241; Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *10; Occupy Bos. v.
City of Boston, No. 11-4152-G, at 2–3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2011),
https://cbsboston.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/untitled.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MYE-P3M4]
(order denying preliminary injunction).
97. Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 241; Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *7–9. Occupy Boston is
an exception: in reversing, the court found that the protest no longer met the threshold for
First Amendment protection. Occupy Bos., No. 11-4152-G, at 13.
98. 854 F. Supp. 2d at 254.
99. Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 246, 254.
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how its assessment shifted, and there was no opinion accompanying the
TRO. 100
The flip between the TRO and preliminary injunction is similarly difficult to reconcile in Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City. 101 The logic of the Isbell
(Occupy Oklahoma City) opinion is muddled. 102 The court acknowledged
that a protected First Amendment right was at stake. 103 It remarked that “[i]t
is well-settled that ‘loss of First Amendment freedoms for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’ ” 104 Yet, it concluded that “[p]laintiffs have failed to make a sufficient showing of
irreparable injury.’ ” 105
In Occupy Columbia v. Haley, the court flipped its ruling on a preliminary injunction after the city formally implemented new regulations. 106 In
the two temporary injunction hearings, the court considered regulations that
were created in direct response to the Occupy movement. At the TRO stage
and the first preliminary injunction hearing, the court deemed the regulations content based as a result of that origin. 107 But the formally implemented regulations considered at the second preliminary injunction hearing were
valid as TPM restrictions that served an important government interest. 108 In
other words, the court implicitly found that the formal regulations were content neutral, straying from its earlier determination. 109
Similarly, the court in Occupy Nashville v. Haslam granted injunctive relief at the TRO stage and later found the new regulations valid.110 There, new
regulations did not exist until after the TRO was granted. 111 Although Occupiers did not contest the new regulations, the court retrospectively discussed
the First Amendment claims, making the case instructive. To the court, the
city had viable options to prevent the Occupiers from sleeping in the encampment overnight after the TRO was granted and before it enacted the

100. Id.
101. 2011 WL 6152852.
102. Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *9.
103. Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV–11–1423–D, 2011 WL 6016906, at *2
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 2, 2011) (“Plaintiffs have raised substantial questions about whether a violation of First Amendment rights can be shown.”).
104. Id. (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
105. Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *9.
106. See No. 3:11–cv–03253–CMC, 2011 WL 6698990, at *7 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2011) (refusing to extend the preliminary injunction to the new regulations).
107. See Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 866 F. Supp. 2d 545, 561 (D.S.C. 2011).
108. Occupy Columbia, 2011 WL 6698990, at *7.
109. See id. (providing the cursory explanation of a similarity to Clark).
110. See 949 F. Supp. 2d 777, 784–85, 790 (M.D. Tenn. 2013), rev’d, 769 F.3d 434 (6th
Cir. 2014).
111. Occupy Nashville, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 784–85.
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new rules. 112 Thus, Occupy Nashville exhibits the same shift as the other cases
that flipped. 113
B. Cases that Vindicated Traditional First Amendment Rights
Many of the Occupy cases considered injunctive relief allowing sleeping—on a theory that it is protected as expressive conduct—alongside requests for relief for other First Amendment infringements. 114 Some courts
vindicated more traditional First Amendment rights, including speech activities like parading 115 and handing out leaflets. For example, the court in
Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin determined that a TRO was inappropriate to protect the tent city, the protesters’ interest in sleeping at the
encampment overnight, and the protesters’ interest in writing with chalk on
the plaza. 116 Instead, the court granted a TRO to protect protesters’ interest
in using signage. 117 In Occupy Fort Myers, the court declined to protect protesters’ interest in sleeping, protesting for twenty-four hours, or maintaining
their tent city; 118 however, the court enjoined enforcement of a permitting
preference that favored “civil events.” 119 The court in Occupy Fresno v. County of Fresno considered and denied preliminary injunctions for sleeping and
staying in the park overnight but granted a preliminary injunction to protect
the distribution of handbills. 120 In Watters v. Otter (Occupy Boise), protesters’ interests in writing with chalk and sleeping at the park were not protected, yet the court eliminated a permitting provision that gave preference to
state-sponsored events. 121

112. Id. at 800.
113. See Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 241, 254 (D. Conn. 2012)
(denying a preliminary injunction protecting the tent city after having granted a TRO); Isbell v.
City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV–11–1423–D, 2011 WL 6152852, at *1, *10 (W.D. Okla. Dec.
12, 2011) (same); Occupy Bos. v. City of Boston, No. 11-4152-G, at 2–3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec.
7, 2011), https://cbsboston.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/untitled.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MYEP3M4] (order denying preliminary injunction); supra text accompanying notes 106–109.
114. See Watters v. Otter, 854 F. Supp. 2d 823, 831 (D. Idaho 2012); Occupy Minneapolis
v. County of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1069 (D. Minn. 2011); Occupy Fort Myers v.
City of Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
115. Although the Supreme Court called parading the “most pristine and classical form”
of First Amendment rights, the Court has also called it “mob law.” Magid, supra note 33, at
475.
116. 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1070–71.
117. Occupy Minneapolis, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1070, 1072.
118. Occupy Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 1331–32, 1334–36.
119. The court also enjoined parading, due to extraneous circumstances. Id. at 1332–36.
120. 835 F. Supp. 2d 849, 863–67, 870 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
121. Watters v. Otter, 26 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1019 (D. Idaho 2014); Watters v. Otter, 986 F.
Supp. 2d 1162, 1176 (D. Idaho 2013). Watters had the best outcome for protesters. The court
entered a permanent injunction that protected the encampment and allowed protestors to remain there for twenty-four hours (but not to sleep in the encampment). Watters, 26 F. Supp.
3d at 1018–19.
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This category of cases illustrates a huge variation in how courts determine whether a regulation is content based. The standards appear even more
diverse across the Occupy movement. 122 Except for Occupy Fresno, 123 each
court produced conclusions about whether the restriction on each activity,
or sub-issue, was content based, rather than determining if the regulation
overall was content based. 124 Injunctive relief turned on whether the regulation of a particular activity was content neutral. Relief was denied if the subissue regulation was content neutral; relief was granted if it was content
based. 125 This was not true for the other categories of cases, where the content determination did not vary by speech activity sub-issues or procedural
stages. 126
In Occupy Minneapolis, the ban on signage was deemed content based
because it only allowed display of state-endorsed signs, implying preferential
treatment for endorsed content. 127 The court’s standard looked only to the
terms of the ordinance. 128 Since a government official administering the regulation “must ‘examine the content of . . . signs to determine whether the

122. In some cases, the court did not ask if the regulation was content based or content
neutral. See, e.g., Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, 949 F. Supp. 2d 777 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); Occupy
Bos. v. City of Boston, No. SUCV201104152G, 2011 WL 7460294 (Mass. Super Ct. Nov. 17,
2011). In Mitchell v. City of New Haven, the court assessed enforcement of the regulation in
practice to determine if it was content based. 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 251 (D. Conn. 2012). In Occupy Eugene v. United States General Services Administration, the court found the regulation
content neutral, despite the fact that the regulation overtly stated its purpose was to enable removal of Occupiers. 43 F. Supp. 3d 1143, 1150 (D. Or. 2014).
123. See Occupy Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 857–58.
124. Watters, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, 866
F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1071 (D. Minn. 2011); Occupy Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
125. See Watters v. Otter, 854 F. Supp. 2d 823 (D. Idaho 2012) (finding Boise’s antisleeping ban content neutral but its anti-tent and protester removal policies content based);
Occupy Minneapolis, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1070–71 (finding regulations that ban signs content
based but anti-camping rules and anti-chalking rules content neutral); Occupy Fort Myers, 882
F. Supp. 2d at 1335 (finding the permitting regulations content based).
126. No other set of cases varies in its determinations about content targeting according
to the type of activity regulated (sub-issue). No other cases vary in between, for example, the
TRO and preliminary injunction hearings (procedural stage). See Occupy Sacramento v. City
of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (finding regulations as a whole
content neutral); Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 245; Occupy Tucson v. City of Tucson, No. CV11-699-TUC-CKJ, 2011 WL 6747860, at *7–8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2011) (finding the permit provision content-neutral); Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV-11-1423-D, 2011 WL
6152852, at *8 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2011) (finding curfew enforcement and the camping ban
content-neutral); Davidovich v. City of San Diego, No. 11cv2675 WQH-NLS, 2011 WL
6013010, (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011) (providing a broad treatment of the regulations as a whole).
But see Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 922 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528–30 (D.S.C. 2013) (discussing the
change in views on content neutrality between the first and second preliminary injunction orders).
127. Occupy Minneapolis, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
128. Id.
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[Resolution] applies,’ ” it is content based. 129 Here, the terms of the ordinance included consideration for the implied terms that administering the
rule as written involved. 130
Similarly, in Occupy Fort Myers, the preference provided to civic events
on the plaza was deemed content based because it “require[d] the recreation
manager to examine the nature of the activity in making a decision to extend
park hours.” 131 The court applied an “on the terms of the regulation” standard. 132 Much like in Occupy Minneapolis, 133 the court applied the standard
loosely. 134 The same standard used elsewhere can mean a textual approach
that requires the statute to directly limit the advancement of specific ideas to
find content targeting. 135
In Watters v. Otter (Occupy Boise), the court found that the anticamping ordinance was content based. 136 The ordinance was not formally
enacted, and it was unenforced before Occupy. 137 The court inferred selective enforcement, finding that the informal rule was only ever enforced
against Occupy. 138 The city implemented formal rules after the TRO hearing
and before the preliminary injunction hearing. 139 The same court assessed
the unwritten rules and later the formal rule. Yet after rules were formally
implemented in response to the court’s TRO decision, the court found the
formal rules content neutral. 140 On review, the district court articulated criteria different from those in its TRO decision. It deemed regulation content
based if it described speech content on its face, distinguished favored speech
from disfavored, or required law enforcement to examine the content of the
message. 141 This rationale abandoned the key criterion that drove the prior

129. Id. (quoting Desert Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. City of Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d 814
(9th Cir. 1996)).
130. Id. The case has another inconsistency. For the anti-sleeping ordinance, since “[t]he
Court [could not] perceive a reason not to apply Clark,” it concluded the regulation was valid,
implying a finding of content neutrality without assessing the terms of the anti-sleeping statue.
Id.
131. Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1335 (M.D. Fla.
2011).
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 127–130 and accompanying text.
134. Compare Occupy Eugene v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1143, 1149 (D.
Or. 2014) (considering overt appearance of political ideas only), with Occupy Fort Myers, 882 F.
Supp. 2d at 1335 (considering implications of the facial text).
135. See, e.g., Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 251 (D. Conn. 2012).
136. 854 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825 (D. Idaho 2012).
137. Watters, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 826.
138. Id. at 829.
139. Watters v. Otter, 986 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1170 (D. Idaho 2013).
140. Watters v. Otter, 955 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1187 (D. Idaho 2013).
141. See id.
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decision: it no longer recognized explicit targeting of the Occupy movement
as a sufficient reason to find the regulations content based. 142
The cases that vindicated other First Amendment rights reflect uneven
adjudication of whether or not the regulation was content based. The courts
applied standards inconsistently, which is made evident not only by comparing the different standards but also by contrasting the internal logic of the
same court at different procedural stages. This demonstrates that the test for
content targeting may be vulnerable to unintentional manipulation, altering
the level of scrutiny required for governmental regulations.
C. Cases Without Relief Granted
In the Occupy cases without relief granted, no form of relief was granted
whatsoever at any stage of the proceedings. This category of cases similarly
displays the previously discussed trends—but in these cases the courts quickly dismissed the First Amendment claim. The courts all either applied a content-neutral frame 143 or did not make any content-targeting
determination. 144
In some cases, courts articulated a circular rationale. Injunctive relief
was not justified because injunctions should only maintain the status quo,
and the ordinance enforcement established the status quo. Thus, the courts
dismissed the cases based on either the plaintiffs’ failure to plead the status
quo or the fact that the ordinance was enforced prior to Occupy. 145 The
quick dismissal of claims is most evident in Occupy Sacramento v. Sacramento and Occupy Pensacola v. City of Pensacola. 146 In both, the cities won on
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 147
All of the cases in this category took place in cities with relatively high
populations of houseless people, anti-sleeping laws, and regular enforcement
of those laws before Occupy started. 148 Thus, courts upheld these ordinances
without hesitation because formal regulations excluding houseless people
were already a frequently enforced part of the criminal law, despite conflict
with recognized First Amendment interests. Furthermore, on average, these
cases commenced long after the cases in the other categories, often after they

142. See id. at 1186–87.
143. See, e.g., Davidovich v. City of San Diego, No. 11cv2675 WQH-NLS, 2011 WL
6013010, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011).
144. See, e.g., Occupy Tucson v. City of Tucson, No. CV-11-699-TUC-CKJ, 2011 WL
6747860, at *7–8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2011).
145. See, e.g., id. at *7.
146. Occupy Pensacola v. City of Pensacola, 569 F. App’x 745, 752 (11th Cir. 2014); Occupy Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
147. Occupy Pensacola, 569 F. App’x at 753; Occupy Sacramento, 878 F.2d 1110.
148. See U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 2011 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT
REPORT TO CONGRESS 8–9, 16 (2012).
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had TRO and preliminary injunction hearings. 149 These cases are in stark
contrast to the sleeping claims in the cases that flipped, where the TRO hearings took place when the encampments were newly set up. 150 Accordingly,
the cases illustrate a negative correlation between success gaining injunctive
relief and the amount of time the protests were on the ground.
The Occupy cases demonstrate odd trends in judicial enforcement. The
cases that flipped reveal a preference for TRO claims over preliminary injunctions and suggest the eroding willingness of courts to find likelihood of
success on the merits over time. In addition, the cases that validated traditional First Amendment protesters’ claims illustrate judicial disapproval of
expressive sleeping activity. As this Comment illustrates in Part III, the presence of visual signs of houselessness at the protests may better explain these
trends.
III. EXCLUDING ACCESSIBLE SPEECH
Judicial interest in policing the aesthetics of public space is a viable explanation for the pattern of enforcement identified in Part II. Section III.A
reexamines the Occupy decisions and suggests that policing the appearance
of houselessness is an alternative explanation for the pattern of judicial enforcement. Section III.B explains the harm involved in policing aesthetics
where speech content is also implicated.
A.

Judicial Enforcement and Aesthetic Policing

The blending of broken windows laws and the First Amendment provides a compelling explanation for what may have animated the pattern of
judicial enforcement. This has sinister implications: it suggests the further
rollback of rights for people without resources, this time in the arena of expression. Courts did not adequately explain why some cases flipped, winning
TROs but not preliminary injunctions. 151 Government policing of aesthetics
provides a persuasive alternative explanation for the change in outcomes. In
each case, the visual disorder in the encampments increased between the
TRO and preliminary injunction stages. Such visual disorder is commonly
associated with houselessness. 152

149. Compare Occupy Pensacola, 569 F. App’x at 746–47, with Occupy Fort Myers v. City
of Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1323 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
150. Compare Occupy Pensacola, 569 F. App’x at 747, with Occupy Fort Myers, 882 F.
Supp. 2d at 1324–25.
151. See supra Section II.A.
152. Compare Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, 949 F. Supp. 2d 777, 786–87, 800 (M.D.
Tenn. 2013) (describing “urinating and defecating” around the encampment and interactions
between houseless persons and protesters), and Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV-111423-D, 2011 WL 6152852, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2011) (describing “deteriorating conditions and a stench” in the protest space), with Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1151–
52 (Cal. 1995) (detailing actions by the city to remove a tent city of houseless persons).
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In Occupy Boston v. City of Boston and Occupy Columbia, the protests
grew larger over time. 153 Interestingly, there was also a change in tone when
the judges discussed the situations at the respective camps. In granting each
TRO, the judges noted mitigating factors, describing protesters and their
camps as well kept. 154 For example, the Occupy Boston court noted that “participants [had] worked with the Boston Fire Marshal to ensure that the structure of the occupation [met] fire regulations.” 155 Similarly, in Occupy
Columbia, the court noted that protesters “work[ed] with the horticulturist
who maintain[ed] the grounds to minimize [the protest’s] impact on the
lawn.” 156 In contrast, the decisions denying the preliminary injunctions
painted a picture of disorderly camps. The Occupy Boston court began by
emphasizing that occupation is not speech as a matter of law. 157 The protest
had always included the claim that its message “can only be effectively communicated through the ‘literal occupation of Boston.’ ” 158 The court described the visual appearance of the encampment at length, in disapproving
terms: “[T]ents are set cheek-to-jowl with stakes, guy ropes, and space only
for three walkways.” 159 It also proclaimed that “[t]he density of people occupying one-quarter acre of land is extraordinary.” 160
In Occupy Columbia, the governor became involved because she was
concerned about the aesthetic damage of the protest group appearing alongside her holiday tree-lighting ceremony. 161 Although the court did not view
the tree-lighting ceremony as a valid reason to remove the group, 162 it did
allow the state to justify removing protesters because of worries about
“crime” and public health. 163
153. See Occupy Bos. v. City of Boston, No. 11-4152-G, at 4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 7,
2011), https://cbsboston.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/untitled.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MYEP3M4] (“More tents and protesters have joined the group.”); Brian McConchie, Occupy Demonstrators Arrested at State House, WACH FOX57 (Nov. 16, 2011, 8:41 PM),
https://wach.com/news/local/occupy-demonstrators-arrested-at-state-house [https://perma.cc/
QS6M-PK4V] (“The group has been rallying at the State House since October 15, usually in
crowds of several dozen.”).
154. Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 866 F. Supp. 2d 545, 549 (D.S.C. 2011); Occupy Bos. v.
City of Boston, No. SUCV201104152G, 2011 WL 7460294, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 17,
2011).
155. Occupy Bos., 2011 WL 7460294, at *4.
156. Occupy Columbia, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
157. Occupy Bos., No. 11-4152-G, at 2.
158. Id. at 11.
159. Id. at 5.
160. Id. at 6.
161. See Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 922 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527–28 (D.S.C. 2013). The governor took action only after receiving a letter from a state senator noting that the protest would
make the tree lighting less “pleasant.” That same day, the governor ordered the protesters removed. In an open letter, she noted damage to the statehouse property. Id.
162. Id. at 535.
163. Occupy Columbia v. Haley, No. 3:11–cv–03253–CMC, 2011 WL 6698990, at *5–6
(D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2011).
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In Isbell (Occupy Oklahoma City) and Occupy Nashville, the increase in
houseless participation is essential to understanding why the courts did not
grant preliminary injunctions. 164 Unlike the situations in Boston and Columbia, in Oklahoma City, 165 the number of protesters decreased over
time. 166 At the preliminary injunction stage, 167 unoccupied tents were described as “an open invitation for homeless persons unaffiliated with the
group.” 168 The court described the people remaining as “mainly transients or
others who were causing disturbances and safety issues.” 169 This highlights a
key assumption: that houselessness and protesting were mutually exclusive.
The city bluntly worried that the camp had become “aesthetically damaging,” and the court validated that view. 170 Professor Marc L. Roark contends
that the visual representation of Occupy Oklahoma City’s message was
“condoned and accepted so long as they were not actually representative of
poor and homeless people, but rather were merely symbolic.” 171 That is, the
speech was only legitimate when it was done on behalf of houseless people,
and it lost legitimacy once the houseless people themselves participated.
As in Oklahoma City, the judge in Occupy Nashville was uncomfortable
with the number of houseless people in the plaza. 172 The judge attributed
negative features of the protest to the houseless people alone, quoting extensively in the opinion to the plaza’s Facilities Administrator, who stated that
“protesters have lost control of the situation with the homeless and the environment has become unsanitary and unsafe.” 173 Under this view, the presence of the houseless people delegitimized the expressive activity and
transformed the entire group into a public nuisance. 174 After houseless people began to utilize the camp as a living space, the encampment was removed. 175

164. See Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, 949 F. Supp. 2d 777, 786 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); Isbell
v. City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV-11-1423-D, 2011 WL 6152852, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12,
2011); Roark, supra note 18, at 61–63.
165. See also supra note 153 and accompanying text.
166. Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *6 (“[T]he number of protestors dwindled . . . .”).
167. The same judge issued the divergent rulings at the TRO and preliminary injunction
stages. See Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *1; Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV-11-1423-D,
2011 WL 6016906, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 2, 2011).
168. Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *6.
169. The court attributes this view to the protester who previously held the protest permit. Id.
170. Id. at *6, *8.
171. Roark, supra note 18, at 62.
172. Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, 949 F. Supp. 2d 777, 786–87 (M.D. Tenn. 2013), rev’d,
769 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2014).
173. Id. at 787.
174. See Roark, supra note 18, at 62.
175. See Tim Ghianni, Police Arrest 29 Occupy Nashville Protesters at Capitol Plaza,
REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2011, 12:31 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tennessee-occupy-
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More information about the context of Occupy Nashville demonstrates a
connection between the use of anti-sleeping ordinances to remove houseless
people and the removal of Occupy protesters. 176 One year before the start of
Occupy, the governor urged the Department of Government Services to create a regulation to diminish the number of houseless people sleeping at the
plaza overnight. 177 By the time the protest started, the anti-sleeping rules
were not yet enacted. Therefore, the regulations that made it impossible for
Occupy to continue were designed to target houseless people from the start.
In the Occupy Nashville opinion, the court stated that “[s]omething needed
to be done to preserve the physical integrity of the Plaza, to reduce or eliminate crime taking place there.” 178 The court’s reasoning bears an uncanny
resemblance to broken windows theory. 179 The Nashville judge viewed the
appearance of the protest as a blemish on an otherwise orderly space and
thought the disorder created a potential site for criminal activity. 180
Commenting on Occupy Nashville, Professor Roark explained an irony:
“[T]he identity of the occupy group shifted from protester to public nuisance. Thus, the occupants of the Plaza were aligned with the negative features of vandalism, public urination, indecent exposure, and the like through
the import of a new rule and a broader collective judgment on the space.”181
He suggests that it was not just the existence of the houseless people, who
were there all along, but that fact combined with the promulgation of new
anti-camping rules that drove the change. 182 The new rules codified that it is
criminal to sleep in the park. In so doing, they affirmed that the people sleeping in the park were not stakeholders engaged in valid park use but were the
criminal “other.” 183 Thus, the new rules created a legal hook for many, including the judge who adjudicated the case, to vindicate the existing goal of
diminishing the appearance of houselessness in public. 184
Mitchell (Occupy New Haven) is difficult to assess because the TRO did
not have an associated opinion. 185 The opinion denying the preliminary injunction voiced a crucial concern. 186 The court lamented, “[t]here is some-

arrests/police-arrest-29-occupy-nashville-protesters-at-capitol-plaza-idUSTRE79R4FU
20111028 [https://perma.cc/X6V7-WTY8].
176. Occupy Nashville, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 786–88.
177. Id. at 786.
178. Id. at 800.
179. See supra Section I.A.
180. Compare Occupy Nashville, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 800, with Amster, supra note 21, at
200 (“For at least six centuries, homelessness has been associated with ‘disorder’ and ‘criminality’. . . .”).
181. Roark, supra note 18, at 62.
182. Id. at 62, 74.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 61–62, 66, 73–80.
185. Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238 (D. Conn. 2012).
186. Id. at 253.
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thing unsatisfying about telling a movement that aims to make visible an often unseen, ignored population that it should content itself with forms of
communication that are only seen when someone seeks them out.”187 It
touched on the central oddity in all cases that flipped. The courts previously
acknowledged the expressive value of sleeping but later removed protection,
unanimously citing interest in maintaining the aesthetics of the parks as an
important governmental interest. 188 Thus, they saw the speech’s value but
were uncomfortable with the conduct’s visual impact. 189
The decisions in the cases that flipped replicated the underlying policy
goals of the criminal exclusion of houseless people in the First Amendment
context. In the Occupy cases, dehumanizing houseless people also denied
several rights not ordinarily at stake with anti-sleeping laws. 190 Houseless
people were participating in recognized First Amendment protected speech,
and the injunction hearings turned on the likelihood of success on the merits
of the First Amendment claim. The determination that the restriction on
speech was valid—despite treading on individual free speech rights—was
based on aesthetic interests. Accordingly, the choice not to protect protesters
embedded a value judgment based on what the protesters and their space
looked like. The same population that was targeted for exclusion from using
public space was silenced. This is a high price to pay to protect a governmental interest in uninterrupted lawn care. 191
The second category of cases, cases that vindicated traditional First
Amendment rights, also featured an odd pattern. Those cases may be explained by courts’ discomfort with expression perceived to have a lasting
disorderly impact and courts’ comfort in vindicating nonvisual, evanescent
forms of communication. Unsuccessful claims correlate with the contentneutral determinations assigned to activities that left a lasting visual impact
on the space. In contrast, successful claims correlate almost exclusively with
content-based determinations awarded to activities that did not leave a lasting visual impact on the space. 192 The pattern likely served to reinforce the
validity of the exclusion of houseless people from public spaces.

187. Id.
188. See Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 114 n.4 (4th Cir. 2013); Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, 949 F. Supp. 2d 777, 800 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 250;
Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City., No. CIV-11-1423-D, 2011 WL 6152852, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Dec.
12, 2011); Occupy Bos. v. City of Boston, No. 11-4152-G, at 5, 18–19 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 7,
2011), https://cbsboston.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/untitled.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MYEP3M4] (order denying preliminary injunction).
189. See, e.g., Occupy Bos., No. 11-4152-G, at 5, 18–19.
190. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 176–178.
191. See, e.g., Watters v. Otter, 986 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1175 (D. Idaho 2013) (validating the
state’s justification of lawn care for removing the Occupy Boise encampment); see also Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439, 475
(2006) (detailing New York City’s attempt to prohibit protests in Central Park due to lawn
preservation).
192. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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In Watters (Occupy Boise), Occupy Fort Myers, Occupy Minneapolis, and
Occupy Fresno, the courts only protected speech with low visual impact.
They protected displaying handheld signs, distributing handbills, and parading. 193 Unlike sleeping in tent encampments, which necessitated an ongoing
and visible presence, the protected activities did not change the park’s appearance. 194 The courts overtly discussed aesthetic interests. For example, the
Fresno court credited the government’s argument that the laws already in
place “maintained[ed] Courthouse Park in aesthetically pleasing and sanitary
conditions for the benefit of all park users.” 195 The Fresno court likely drew a
parallel between the format of the protest and the already infamous tent encampments, 196 commonly erected by houseless residents for survival and a
familiar sight in Fresno long before Occupy began. 197 Crucially, classic forms
of First Amendment speech interests—for example, a published writing, a
speech, or a parade—leave only a subtle or fleeting visual.
Oddly, Watters (Occupy Boise) and Occupy Minneapolis both rejected
protesters’ interests in writing in chalk as a form of expression. 198 Chalk is
not permanent; nonetheless, courts made clear that they viewed it as an activity with a high visual impact. Watters is paradigmatic of how the camps
were associated with blight, due to the visual impact of speech. In Watters,
the court explained that anti-chalking rules are valid TPM restrictions, because the government has a substantial interest in “controlling the aesthetic
appearance” of its facilities. 199 It noted that aesthetic interest is also a legitimate reason to proscribe “unpleasant formats for expression.” 200 Furthermore, it said that “the substantive evil—visual blight—is not merely a
possible byproduct” but an inherent result of use of “the medium”—chalk. 201
The opinion makes a false equivalence between chalk and painted graffiti.

193. Watters, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1172; Occupy Fresno v. County of Fresno, 835 F. Supp.
2d 849, 869 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d
1062, 1072 (D. Minn. 2011); Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320,
1333–34 (M.D. Fla. 2011); see supra Section II.B.
194. See Occupy Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 864; see supra Section II.B.
195. Occupy Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 871.
196. See, e.g., Diana Marcum, Occupy Fresno: More than 20 People Arrested over the
Weekend, L.A. TIMES: L.A. NOW (Nov. 7, 2011, 12:58 PM), https://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
lanow/2011/11/occupy-fresno-more-than-20-arrested.html [https://perma.cc/S8HS-WSTA].
197. See Occupy Fresno Stalls Clearing of Homeless Camp, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 28,
2011, 12:17 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2011/10/28/occupy-fresno-stalls-clearing-ofhomeless-camp/ [https://perma.cc/Z838-JXPT].
198. Watters, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1169; Occupy Minneapolis, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. This
was, of course, in addition to the rejection of sleeping interests. Watters v. Otter, 854 F. Supp.
2d 823, 831 (D. Idaho 2012); Occupy Minneapolis, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
199. Watters, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1173.
200. Id. at 1174 (quoting Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 806 (1984)).
201. Id. (quoting Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
806 (1984)).
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Vilification of graffiti is common to broken windows policing, 202 which imagines vandalism as a symptom of untended property, threatening a breakdown of control. 203 The court stated that “even temporary blight” may be
removed; accordingly, it made no difference that chalk washes away in the
rain. 204 This presents an exaggerated account of the state’s aesthetic interests.
Professor Timothy Zick explains that leaving a mark on physical space,
such as drawing in chalk, is communicative under a rubric of legal geography. 205 He uses the term “inscription” for the act of conveying an idea or experience by writing on the physical space, noting that restrictions on
inscription “are often justified as necessary to prevent visual blight.” 206 Zick
argues that it is essential to realize that restrictions on inscription “eliminate
cheap and efficient methods of writing in spaces frequented by the public.”207
Moreover, he alleges that restrictions on inscriptions “define not only norms
of community aesthetics, but proper communicative methods as well.” 208
The law is open to considerable discretion in deciding what is content
neutral. 209 Alarmingly, governmental aesthetic controls in the guise of content-neutral restrictions engender less scrutiny. 210 The label obscures the cost
to houseless persons’ speech. Thus, there is a high risk that courts’ unconscious manipulation of the content-targeting test replicates preexisting power relationships. By prioritizing an orderly aesthetic for public parks, courts
pushed houseless, unsheltered people out of view, excluding them from expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.
The final category of cases, those that were not granted any form of relief, also featured visually based considerations. These cases featured the
same justification: the need to clear the protest from the space to make way
for other uses. 211 For example, in Davidovich v. City of San Diego the court

202. Jenny E. Carroll, Graffiti, Speech, and Crime, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1285, 1306 (2019).
Much like public sleeping, “[g]raffiti is calculated in terms of the damage it causes and not in
terms of the speech value it may contain.” Cf. id. at 1288. “Criminal law regulates graffiti as a
property or nuisance offense. . . . [I]t signals a subdermal lawlessness that will lead to greater
harm if left unchecked.” Id. at 1286.
203. See Amster, supra note 21, at 207.
204. Watters, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
205. See Zick, supra note 191, at 473–74. .
206. Id.
207. Id. at 474.
208. Id. at 475.
209. See, e.g., Occupy Eugene v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1143, 1150 (D.
Or. 2014) (finding the regulation content neutral despite its stated purpose to remove the Occupy protesters).
210. See supra Section I.B.
211. Occupy Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119–20 (E.D. Cal.
2012); Occupy Tucson v. City of Tucson, No. CV-11-699-TUC-CKJ, 2011 WL 6747860, at *8
(D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2011); Freeman v. Morris, No. 11-cv-00452-NT, 2011 WL 6139216, at *12
(D. Me. Dec. 9, 2011), amended Dec. 22, 2011; Davidovich v. City of San Diego, No. 11cv2675
WQH-NLS, 2011 WL 6013010, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011).
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explained that the municipal code that banned sleeping in the park “serve[d]
significant government interests in . . . ensuring that the public space is free
of obstructions and is available for the use and enjoyment of members of the
public.” 212 This frequently provided justification is not unique to the cases
without any relief granted. 213
The court in Freeman v. Morris (Occupy Augusta) took the logic of
making way for other uses one step further. The court explained that the
protest could not remain because it would suppress the free speech of hypothetical future protests that would ostensibly be vying for the same space and
unable to coexist. 214 This is problematic; it automatically placed the interests
of hypothetical future groups over ongoing speech based only on the format
the speech took.
The court in Freeman acted as though the movement was only performative and its form coincidental, parallel to the empty words used in filibustering. 215 The explicit purpose of a filibuster is the exclusion of other
speech to force a particular conversation. 216 Occupy did aspire to transform
the discussion around politics; however, its expression did not come at the
cost of excluding other speech. More importantly, the conduct itself engaged
in a political conversation. The form itself was full of meaning, unlike speech
in a filibuster. The confusion was made possible by the content-neutral
frame, used in all the cases without relief. 217 The threshold test that determines if the First Amendment applies “only helps determine whether the act
is indeed expressive rather than merely functional.” 218 The next step in adjudication is a check for content targeting, which treats expressive conduct no
differently from spoken or written words. 219 When the act, like sleeping, can
be merely functional, it is likely that regulations of general application aimed
at the act will also appear content neutral. 220

212. Davidovich, 2011 WL 6013010, at *4.
213. See, e.g., Occupy Fresno v. County of Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d 849, 859 (E.D. Cal.
2011) (noting that the city has a substantial government interest in “regulating competing uses” of the public space at issue).
214. Freeman, 2011 WL 6139216, at *12.
215. Compare id. at *10, with Dana Milbank, Ted Cruz’s Phony Obamacare Filibuster
Was Really About . . . Ted Cruz, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/ted-cruzs-phony-obamacare-filibuster-was-really-about--tedcruz/2013/09/25/b8f273a8-2632-11e3-b3e9-d97fb087acd6_story.html
[https://perma.cc/
9KYU-LY65].
216. Filibuster and Cloture, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm [https://perma.cc/SWX2-2B47] (“The term
filibuster—from a Dutch word meaning ‘pirate’—became popular in the 1850s, when it was
applied to efforts to hold the Senate floor in order to prevent a vote on a bill.”).
217. See supra notes 143–144 and accompanying text.
218. Magid, supra note 33, at 501.
219. Id. at 477, 501.
220. See id. at 484–85.
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The purported justification that exclusion of houseless persons is necessary to make way for other public uses is also often advanced in broken windows campaigns to justify anti-sleeping rules. 221 The idea is that the law
applies equally to unsheltered and sheltered persons. 222 But the rules transform public spaces into liminal areas that merely reinforce neighboring public property rights at the expense of unsheltered persons whom the
regulations disenfranchise. 223 And there are additional repercussions in the
realm of the First Amendment. The perceived visual disorder likely delegitimized the twenty-four-hour protest as a form of speech. Mark Bray, one of
the founders of Occupy New York, explained this disparity in speech rights.
In discussing negative media portrayals of the movement, he contended that
“elites can go through the front door, while the back door is ‘designed for the
poorer actors and the entrance fee is often paid for in (what could be labeled)
the “dues of disorder.” ’ ” 224 The same laws that disenfranchise people also
disenfranchise speech about their interests. 225 The Freeman decision exemplifies this; the court reasoned that any other kind of speech that might take
place in the future is more valuable than Occupy’s current speech due solely
to the movement’s twenty-four-hour protest format. 226
B. Silencing Houseless Speech
The selective protection of First Amendment rights based on aesthetics
is far from benign. There is an essential connection between the Occupy
movement’s message and the unprotected conduct. The movement’s inclusion of houseless populations and its efforts to speak to issues related to indigence fused content and expressive conduct. Declining to protect
Occupiers’ use of sleeping as expressive conduct fortified the systematic exclusion of speech by and about houseless people in public spaces.
The Occupy movement’s political message is relevant to issues of houselessness. The movement, designed as a nonhierarchical, consensus-based or-

221. See supra Section III.A.
222. See Amster, supra note 21, at 200 (“[U]nder the guise of universal applicability that
plainly affect only the target community: ‘The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as
well as the poor to sleep under the bridges.’ ” (quoting Jeremy Waldron, Essay, Homelessness
and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 295, 313 n.30 (1991) (translating ANATOLE FRANCE,
LE LYS ROUGE 87 (1910)))).
223. See id. at 204–06.
224. MARK BRAY, TRANSLATING ANARCHY: THE ANARCHISM OF OCCUPY WALL STREET
22 (2013) (quoting Gadi Wolfsfeld, Media, Protest, and Political Violence: A Transactional
Analysis, 127 JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS 1, 8 (1991)).
225. Zick, supra note 191, at 475 (“[B]attles over access [to public space] tend to pit political and social elites against less-powerful residents who wish to retain . . . access to them.”).
226. See Freeman v. Morris, No. 11-cv-00452-NT, 2011 WL 6139216, at *12 (D. Me. Dec.
9, 2011) (denying a preliminary injunction because “all comers” should have access to the
space), amended Dec. 12, 2011.
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ganization, 227 is multi-vocal. 228 An all-local-movements articulation of Occupy’s goals would have aspired to address the failure of our representative
government and the problem of income inequality. 229 Protesters involved in
the First Amendment cases believed that the symbolic content of sleeping in
the tent encampments made the connection between Occupy and houselessness issues overt. 230 For example, in Mitchell (Occupy New Haven), protesters explained that the encampment served as “a tangible reminder of the
reality of homelessness and the hardship of poverty, facts often swept out of
sight . . . in urban areas.” 231
Above symbolism, the Occupy protest format was designed to include
indigent people. As Mark Bray explained, “ ‘we don’t have demands; we are
the demand.’ In other words [Occupy Wall Street] was embodying the world
it desired.” 232 This idea permeated the local Occupy groups involved in the
First Amendment cases. For example, in Occupy Boston an Occupy advocate
explained that “more perfect democracy can only be effectively communicated through the ‘literal occupation’ . . . . [T]he occupation is the message.”233
Similarly, nearly all the other local Occupy groups articulated the goal of
embodying a more egalitarian world. 234 The inclusion of all interested persons was not just a feature of the movement but also a core tenet of the content of the speech. The overlap in the conduct the movement sought to

227. NYC GEN. ASSEMBLY, STRUCTURE AND PROCESS GUIDE TO OWS 5, 8–9,
https://macc.nyc/img/assemblies/OWSStructure.pdf [https://perma.cc/586E-HSL3].
228. See Anthony L. Fisher, Occupy, 6 Years Later, WEEK (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://theweek.com/articles/724178/occupy-6-years-later [https://perma.cc/QC2T-LEZM].
229. See Sarah Leberstein & Anastasia Christman, Occupy Our Occupations: Why “We
Are the 99%” Resonates with Working People and What We Can Do to Fix the American Workplace, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1073, 1104–05 (2012).
230. Occupy Eugene v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1143, 1146 (D. Or. 2014)
(“[T]he group set up a tent to be used as a prop that would draw attention to the issue that
homeless people did not have a place to legally sleep during the night.”); Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV-11-1423-D, 2011 WL 6152852, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2011) (“[L]iving
in tents signifies poor and homeless people in a battle with Wall Street and government as a
result of economic events, such as mortgage foreclosures and the financial crisis.”); Occupy
Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1066 (D. Minn. 2011) (“[A] ‘24/7’
presence at the Plazas is necessary to effectively communicate their message, such as the fact
‘that the foreclosure crisis and homelessness are problems affecting millions of Americans.’ ”
(quoting Complaint ¶ 22, Occupy Minneapolis, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (No. 0:11-cv-03412), ECF
No. 1)).
231. Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 242 (D. Conn. 2012) (quoting
Second Amended Complaint at 4, Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238 (D. Conn. 2012) (No. 3:120cv00370)).
232. BRAY, supra note 224, at 103 (footnote omitted) (quoting Swedish anarchist, People’s Kitchen organizer, and Rutgers PhD student Stina Soderling).
233. Occupy Bos. v. City of Boston, No. 11-4152-G, at 11 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2011),
https://cbsboston.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/untitled.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MYE-P3M4]
(order denying preliminary injunction).
234. See, e.g., Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 112 (4th Cir. 2013); Occupy Eugene, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1146; Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *4.
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protect and the content of its speech was not a lucky accident but the intentional marriage of action and plan. 235
Unfortunately, the inclusion of houseless people also subjected each local movement to courts’ inability to consider the bond between conduct and
content. 236 Occupy’s inclusive agenda drove the conduct-based speech. The
courts recognized the speech, but the content-driven scrutiny determination
could not account for conduct as content. 237
In order to be visible and inclusive, the protests had only one option: the
traditional public forum. Although public fora enjoy the most First Amendment protection, the same spaces are regulated by criminal law, which often
criminalizes houseless persons. 238 The convergence of these two problems
produced the ultimate failure of all Occupy First Amendment challenges
and, troublingly, the exclusion of houseless persons’ speech from public fora.
As houseless, unsheltered people are likely in a position where the public forum is the only venue ostensibly available, the issue is significant.239 Moreover, as the Occupy cases demonstrate, current jurisprudence weighs heavily
against groups interested in speaking about issues related to houselessness. 240
The result is systemic failure to appropriately protect speech by and about
houseless people.
Policing the content of speech based on the income or the appearance of
the speaker is categorically unacceptable. The judicial system must treat
symbolic speech carefully. Expressive conduct “has been called ‘the poor
man’s printing press’ because for many people without the power, prestige,
and financial resources . . . action is the only way to effectively convey their
views to a wide group of people.” 241 Ironically, the Supreme Court created
the content-targeting assessment to avoid the danger of message- and speaker-based bias.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that the adjudication of expressive conduct in
cases that challenged anti-sleeping ordinances raises concerns about the accessibility of expression. The Occupy movement cases that initially granted
injunctive relief removed protections after an increase in visual indicia of
houselessness. Other cases illustrated a preference for classic First Amendment rights, which left no trace in the public park, over the accessible speech
interests in camping and sleeping. And when rules criminalizing houseless235. Howard, supra note 40, at 475, 482–83 (2013); Kaste, supra note 9; Komlik, supra
note 9.
236. See supra Section III.A.
237. See Magid, supra note 33, at 502–03; supra Section III.A.
238. See supra Section III.A.
239. See Roark, supra note 18, at 110–13.
240. See supra notes 223–226 and accompanying text.
241. Magid, supra note 33, at 471 (footnote omitted) (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., The
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 30).
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ness were already well enforced, courts were most willing to swiftly dismiss
First Amendment challenges. Together, the Occupy cases illustrated the systematic exclusion of conduct-based expression by and about houseless people.
There is a deep tension in the concept of removing houseless people to
keep public spaces aesthetically pleasing for public use. Advocates of beauty
at the cost of excluding houseless persons are often motivated by promoting
property rights: 242 people with property adjacent to public spaces are the
beneficiaries of the strict rules that impose exclusion. 243 Moreover, the government’s interest is often aligned with tighter control over public spaces. 244
Against this backdrop, houseless people in public spaces are not invaders,
but they are the “canary in the coalmine—the immediate victims of its colonization.” 245 The Occupy movement’s speech interests were aligned with accessibility. Despite the movement’s name, Occupy may have been not the
colonizer but the canary.

See Amster, supra note 21, at 206, 208.
Id. at 206.
See Kevin Francis O’Neill, Privatizing Public Forums to Eliminate Dissent, 5 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 201, 202–13 (2007).
245. Amster, supra note 21, at 206.
242.
243.
244.
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